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Abstract
Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an
important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences.
Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple
her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontolog-
ical credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to
the Kind’s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits
of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental
sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individua-
tion criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind’s multiple projectable
properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for
both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be
cleared.
Keywords Scientific realism · Historical essences · Species · Natural kinds · Path
dependency · Essentialism
Before the Origin, scientists had sought the intrinsic purpose and meaning of
taxonomic order. Darwin replied that the ordering reflects historical pathways
pure and simple
Stephen Jay Gould, Evolution and the Triumph of Homology, or Why History
Matters
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1 Introduction
Natural kinds, real kinds, or, from now on following John Stuart Mill, simply, Kinds,
are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or
“special”) sciences (Boyd 1991, 2010; Kornblith 1995; Wilson 1999; Snyder 2005; cf.
Massimi 2014). Essential natures are less in vogue. In this paper, I will argue that the
realist would do well to couple their Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen
their epistemic and ontological credentials. These essential natures need not however
be intrinsic to the Kind’s members; they may be historical.
My argument here will almost exclusively concern the case of species and the
claim that historical essences can underpin these local claims of scientific realism.
Although I will make some suggestive remarks along the way about how the morals
about scientific realism and historical essences might generalize to other cases, a full
exploration of the generalizability will have to wait for another occasion.1 This limited
focus on species has some important advantages though.
First, there is good reason to think that a lot hangs on the issue of species since they
often take center stage in discussions not only of biological Kinds, but also of Kinds
more generally. Even Ian Hacking, no fan of natural kind talk, agrees that: “Biological
species have long served as paradigms of natural kinds—they are (one feels) natural
kinds if anything is” (2007, p. 234). So a successful treatment for the paradigm case
of species should have more general implications as well.
Second, there is plenty of philosophical interest in the case of species in its own
right. A dominant view holds that species lack essential natures. Yet a by now familiar
response is that this does not refute essentialism of species altogether as they may
have historical rather than intrinsic essential natures (Hull 1978; Griffiths 1999; Mil-
likan 1999; Okasha 2002; Rieppel 2007; Ereshefsky 2014; for related arguments in
biology see also Simpson 1951; Gould 1986; De Queiroz 1999). However as histor-
ical essences are relational to their members, they are thought to suffer from some
significant epistemic and ontological shortcomings (Hull 1978; Okasha 2002; Elder
2008; Ellis 2011). The view therefore seems to come at a cost for scientific realists
and other ontologically committed views about species. Hence, another aim of the
paper is to counter the prevailing pessimism and skepticism associated with a his-
torical essentialist view of species. By implication, my quarrel will not primarily be
with intrinsic essentialism of species (Devitt 2008, 2010)—or only to the extent that it
invokes skeptical claims against historical essences (cf. Godman and Papineau 2019).
2 Scientific realism and the essential natures of kinds
According to scientific realists, science aims and is able to uncover the true, or approxi-
mately true, organization of the world. That there is way in which the world is organized
is the ontological part of scientific realism and that we aim and are able to access it
1 Although I tend to agree that scientific realism should be defended in a piecemeal fashion (see e.g. Kincaid
2000), I hope to provide some ideas for how similar arguments can be made from the historical essences of
other non-fundamental or “special science” kinds in the work of Millikan (1999), Bach (2012) and Godman
(2015, 2018).
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represents the epistemic component. Following Alexander Bird’s recommendation, I
believe a scientific realist should also include a condition of how true beliefs about
the world are acquired (2007). It cannot be a matter of accidentally arriving at the true
beliefs; if it is scientific knowledge we are concerned with, it must be acquired through
a cumulative process of empirical investigation and theorizing. Done right, we might
deem this process scientific progress.
Now, to be fair, many scientific instrumentalists and conventionalists can accept
most if not all of the above. So usually the scientific knowledge distinctively asserted
by realists concerns deeper posits or those commonly thought of as unobservables.
But in the non-fundamental sciences, where induction rules the day, it is not the
lack of observability that is the main issue. What tends to be the concern here is the
empirical knowledge of a robust or objective basis for the categories used in inductive
practice.2 The basic line of thought is the following: Realists will grant that the relevant
scientific categories are often identified via observable features (not least in the case of
species). However merely identifying instances that share some similar features—that
also might only be so deceptively—is deemed insufficient for true scientific progress.
Instead, it is the existence of an objective, robust or, if you will, mind-independent,
basis for the categories with similar features, which may or may not be observable,
that is at the heart of scientific realism.
I believe that it is this concern to defend our knowledge of the objective grounds
for categorization that has, or at least should, motivate an enduring interest in essential
natures. The most prominent plea for essential natures in the last decades is found
in the work of Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980). Although they did not focus on
scientific realism per se, but on the semantic and modal implications of real essences,
their concerns are often picked up or interpreted in light of scientific realist concerns
(e.g. Churchland 1985). I here want to nominate two important epistemic roles—indi-
viduation and explanation—for essential natures of Kinds that are present in the work
of Putnam and Kripke (but also to some extent in earlier thinkers like Aristotle and
Mill3) that I believe serve the purposes of scientific realists.
2.1 The individuating role of essences
The first role for essential natures is to secure objective and robust membership criteria
of Kinds. Putnam’s famous argument was precisely that reference of Kind terms is
secured by the existence of essential natures, such that the members of Kinds need
neither be united by incidental superficial resemblances nor by whichever descriptions
(or use) we happen to attach to Kind terms. Instead, an instance or individual receives
its Kind membership in virtue of sharing an essential nature with other instances of
the same Kind. For the realist such an individuation criteria for Kinds is crucial. It is
what underpins the successful use of Kinds in our inferential practice since there are
2 Of course a scientific realist of the non-fundamental sciences does have the option of abandoning a thesis
that relies on (real) Kinds or on entities. One may, for example, instead adopt a structural realism for these
sciences (e.g. French 2011).
3 It is at least arguable that John Stuart Mill envisioned a “Kind-style” scientific realism although he did not
assign essential natures to his Kinds (for some further discussion, see Boyd 1991; Millikan 1999; Hacking
2007).
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some real grounds for unifying different samples. This can also explain our relative
success in extrapolating, generalizing, and in constructing taxonomies based on Kinds
compared to those apparent categories which may only have superficial properties in
common. Essential natures can also help establish inter-theoretic identities between
scientific domains in the same or in different historical points of time. This is important
if one wishes to counter arguments such as the pessimistic induction that aims to block
the idea of scientific progress.
But, hold on. Along Lockean lines we might worry whether there really are essential
natures—especially given that the track record of the categories used in the inductive
sciences being a mixed bag of retention, revision, and removal. This is where it helps
if the essential nature is known, since we then also have a better way of justifying our
inductive practice. According to Kripke not only does our linguistic and inferential
success hinge on there being robust grounds for individuating Kinds, we can also learn a
posteriori what these grounds are: we discover that ‘Water is H2O’ whereas previously
we were in the dark about the cause of any semantic, inductive and taxonomic success.
In fact, we can fit this into a (non-accidental) knowledge requirement that I, following
Bird, suggested should be included in a scientific realism. That is, not only is a Kind’s
essence knowable a posteriori; typically there is some, and often a significant, scientific
contribution and taxonomic revision involved in its “uncovering”.4
The scientific contribution in question is often simply equated with empirical inves-
tigation, but the contribution from theorizing should not be neglected. After all the a
posteriori fact (or if you will, necessity5) that all samples of water have the molec-
ular structure of H2O is one arrived at through considerable theoretical controversy
in chemistry; yet is precisely the sort of achievement that a scientific realist must
rely on in order to explain how both ignorance and failure in science is compati-
ble with progress overall. Some folk taxonomies have in the past been ignorant but
lucky (as in the case of water), while others have gone plain wrong (such as famously
including whales in the category, Fish). But classificatory revisions in light of science
have led to epistemic payoffs for our inductive practice (i.e. with knowledge of the
essential natures we no longer project whale-type similarities on to all fish and vice
versa and we also have a better understanding of the scope for our inferences about
water). The possibility of a posteriori discovered essences does make some initial
sense of this development where it is science itself that provides us with progressively
more robust individuation conditions of the Kinds, thus modifying and improving on
existing classifications, in terms of improving the scope and reliability of our infer-
ences.
4 In contrast, Muhammed Ali Khalidi has suggested that it may be conceptually possible that we discover
the essential—or in his terms most important properties—that both defines and explains the Kind’s nature
without further scientific work being required (2013, p. 55). But this conceptual possibility seems to me
of little consequence for a scientific realist since they need the discovery of natural kind essences to be an
epistemic accomplishment, to justify taxonomic and inductive practice, and as a starting point for making
not-mere-luck arguments.
5 See Mallozzi (2018) and Godman et al. (under consideration) for a discussion of the modal consequences
of the view.
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2.2 The explanatory role of essences
John Stuart Mill’s contributions to theorizing about Kinds were lasting and, for the
field, unusually uncontroversial. In his view, the scientific use of Kinds, as opposed to
other concocted groups of individuals like White Horse, could be explained by Kinds
supporting a comparably greater—or even an unlimited—quantity of generalizations
(1872). Few would dispute that the comparable epistemic advantage of categories
which afford multiple projectable features. It is less observed that Kinds are also
epistemically valuable as groups with relevant variations within members. In the
case of species, it has for instance been argued that any model of species cannot
overlook polymorphic and other polytypic species that display significant variations
amongst their members (Ereshefsky and Matthen 2005; Magnus 2011). Yet much of the
polymorphic variation is systematic, heritable, and so gives rise to further projectable
features amongst instances. Moreover members of different polytypic species also
have many characteristics in common in Mill’s original sense. In general intra-Kind
variation is expected and should not undermine certain instances belonging to the
same Kind. Thus the role for Kinds in supporting multiple projectable properties still
stands, keeping in mind that there may also be both projectable and non-projectable
variation amongst members.
Many are content to treat this multiple projectability as an unexplainable
“brute fact” (Lewens 2012), “real pattern” (Dennett 1991), or “bare projectabil-
ity” (Häggqvist 2005). However, I’d contend that scientific realists, in con-
trast, have to be more ambitious, especially if they are to avoid the charge
that multiple projectability is simply superficial or even a deceptive feature.
In this vein, Ruth Millikan contends that Real Kinds are richly projectable
due to some natural ground (2000, p. 18). Michael Devitt in the same vein
argues that generalizations about the morphology, physiology, and behavior across
members of a species demand an explanation: “Why are they so?” (2008,
p. 352).
This then leads us to the second role of essential natures observed by both Putnam
and Kripke: they offer a deeper explanans. More precisely, essential natures causally
explain the inductive unity across dimensions of similarity and systematic variation
displayed by members of a Kind. For scientific realists at least, discovering a Kind’s
essential nature would thus not only be a matter of providing (improved) grounds for
individuation and scope of inductive inference, but also a matter of explaining why it is
that members of a Kind jointly achieve a certain reliable inductive structure. Essences
should explain the Kind’s multiple projectability.
A good question at this point is: what is the relationship between these respective
roles of essences? Samir Okasha has pointed out that there is no a priori reason to
assume that something can or even should both individuate and explain Kind mem-
bership (2002, p. 203f.). In other words, we need not assume that the essence, in
the sense of providing the grounds for individuation, should also be able to causally
explain multiple projectability (and vice versa). As we shall see in the succeeding
sections, both Okasha and Devitt also offer some reasons for thinking the roles come
apart in the case of species.
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While my argument does not require an a priori assumption in what follows, I would
like to submit some initial reasons to think that the two basic roles of essences do in
fact come together in a unified account, which will also be born out it in the proceeding
argument. First, it seems plausible to me that the capacity of providing explanations
of multiple projectability is what gives us reason to think that a property is, in fact, an
essence of the Kind in the first place. It is hard to see how one can provide the identity
and call something the essential nature of a Kind, if it did not also have some special
explanatory import or power vis-à-vis other properties that belong to a Kind (Kung
1977).6 Moreover, at least for scientific realists, it seems like the empirical enquiry
into the structures causally responsible for (and hence, explanatory of) the projectable
features should also have a bearing on the individuation conditions of the Kind.7 There
is also an argument for a unified account from the other direction: to explain a Kind’s
multiple projectability one seems to rely on some individuation condition in the first
place. That is, a causal explanation is also constrained by the fact that they apply to
all members of the Kind. If they were only applicable to, say, a subclass of members
of the Kind, it is unclear how the explanation would also explain the Kind’s multiple
projectability—a characteristic that is essentially distributed amongst all and only all
members. Accepting these arguments would mean that although we can separate the
two roles of essential natures at a conceptual and epistemic level, from an ontological
and empirical perspective the essence of a Kind is one and the same thing.
3 The historical essential natures of species
3.1 Individuation
Linnéan binomial nomenclature attained some inductive success by organizing
organisms into species within nested categories. Though some species have been reor-
ganized, many of the species noted by von Linné are still recognized by the best current
6 I thank Ville Paukkonen for pointing me toward some interesting historical precedents to the discussion
of the two roles of essences. Pasnau (2004), for instance traces two similar roles in Aristotele’s philosophy
of substantial forms; namely, first, to give an abstract characterization of what a particular substance is, and
thus to provide the identity of the Kind, and second, especially important to the scholastics, a more concrete
role to explain the natural effects of a substance. My own argument about the interconnections between
these roles here draws heavily on Joan Kung’s interpretation of Aristotle: “Aristotle also makes it clear that
the properties which belong essentially to anything have explanatory power vis-à-vis the other properties
of things of that kind. This is no mere fortunate accident. The fact that a property had explanatory power is
given as a reason for counting it essential to a thing and the fact that a property lacks ‘explanatory power’
rules out the property belonging essentially to the thing under consideration”(1977, p. 370).
7 Not all avowed realists seem to think the investigations into the causal structure gets us all the way to
a membership criteria. According to Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account, (1991,
2010) there can be multiple sources of the same clustering. Hence homeostatic mechanisms can uphold,
but do not wholly individuate, the clusters. In Matthew Slater’s recent stable property cluster (SPC) account
(2015), Kinds are simply defined in terms of the cliquish existence of stable, but not wholly uniform,
property clusters. Hence neither account provides a causal explanation of clusters that also individuates the
Kind in question. As Thomas Reydon has argued, these accounts therefore fall short in guiding predictions
or scope of the inductive inferences connected to the Kind (2009). In lieu of some other way to individuate
Kinds or determine membership, I therefore think it is doubtful how far the scientific realism of both the
SPC and HPC accounts goes.
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classificatory systems. At the same time, binomial nomenclature did not provide much
of a systematic basis for its taxonomic order. After Darwin, this would change deci-
sively when he proposed that common descent was an explanation for nested taxa.
This insight was carried through in the subsequent work in species classification within
the Modern Synthesis, represented by figures like Theodosius Dobzhansky, George
Simpson, and Ernst Mayr and the rise of phylogenetics.
In the preceding section, I suggested that a promising way for a scientific realist to
account for the developments after Darwin is that the right individuation conditions
behind the intuitive biological taxonomic categories were uncovered by gradually
revealing a causal explanatory basis for it—or, in short, one that has to do with dis-
covering the essential natures of species. In fact, Darwin and many of the authors of
the Modern Synthesis appear to have been in disagreement about the nature of species
and what’s more, it’s arguable that they were anti-essentialists (Godman 2019). Nev-
ertheless, I will argue that with the help of a historical relation uniting a species, a
scientific realist does have essential natures at their avail that can both individuate as
well as explain the multiple projectable properties associated with these biological
Kinds. It is to this task I now turn, beginning with individuation.
At least at first pass, the individuation criterion follows straightforwardly: an organ-
ism belongs to a species taxon in virtue of its spatial–temporal location in the tree of
life.8 The essence of a species taxon is then the particular historical relation that unites
its members. As we shall see, the historical relation is not any old relation or rela-
tional property: at first approximation it consists of a unique lineage of spatially and
temporally ordered individuals. As we are in search of the individuation criteria, we
might bracket questions about the scale and mechanisms by which such lineages are
formed until the next section on causal explanations. The key here is to appreciate how
the historical relation of a lineage individuates; how it is essential to the individual
member of a species taxon, in the sense that it is a relation (or relational property)
that an instance could not lose without also ceasing to be a member of that particular
taxon. The essence has the modal force of being a necessary property of the Kind.9
The knowledge of the historical essences is a posteriori twice over. First, the fact
that species have historical essential natures is an a posteriori matter (something
which Darwin and others helped establish). Second, specific lineages of species are
known a posteriori. As we cannot directly observe lineages, the latter is primarily
established with the use of cladistics and phylogenetic methods for reconstructing lin-
eages. It is important to stress that phylogenetics makes no a priori assumption about
8 To be more cautious, I would say tree of speciation rather than of life as I have some reservations about
whether prokaryotes like various forms of bacteria due to pervasive lateral transmission can constitute
reproductive lineages or even lineages, although they are clearly living organisms and biological Kinds (see
e.g. Doolittle 1999).
9 A word about the possibility of swamp tigers and related thought experiment: on the historical-relational
account, I believe the right thing to say is that there is a genuine metaphysical possibility of swamp individuals
that resemble tigers. Yet these individuals are not members of the species taxon, Panthera Tigris. Because
they do not share a lineage of historical reproduction with other tigers, this also implies that we are not
licensed to assume that they are multiply projectable along with others tigers. This is true however many
similarities are noted amongst “swamp tigers” and real members of the historical Kind, Panthera Tigris,
simply because they do not share an essence in common. Hence accepting the metaphysical possibility of
individual swamp tigers does not violate the Kind individuation criteria of the historical essentialist account.
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the spatial–temporal relationships between different species; instead phylogenies are
constructed based on different methods of producing data, either on morphological
evidence or, more commonly, molecular evidence of DNA and RNA sequences.
With the assumption that convergent evolution is rare, two species with a greater
number of shared characters from either of these domains is taken as evidence of them
having more recent common ancestry compared to two species with fewer shared
characters. Individuals are then grouped together into monophyletic groups at par-
ticular nodes, either by a speciation event (typically branching) or a terminal node.
Moreover the increasing work in computational phylogenetics—explicitly designed
to not confirm pre-existing assumptions of phylogenetic relationships—is regarded as
further support for hypotheses concerning branching relationships.
I take this to be a form of”triangulation” of lineages or historical essences, where
triangulation means that the robustness of the hypotheses about lineages and speciation
are increased because of the decreased chance of error and bias when diverse and inde-
pendent sources of evidence are employed (Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2016). The
scientific realism espoused here just adds that such triangulation gets at the (approx-
imately) correct structure that individuates different species. Such triangulation has
also yielded some surprising and significant revisions to our initial classifications
and membership criteria of taxa. Take the case of the critically endangered Christ-
mas Island shrew, Crocidura attenuata trichura. To a casual observer, these tiny,
beady-eyed, mole-like individuals look exactly like the North American shrew, but by
triangulating evidence from different domains, we get a genealogical tree where the
Australian shrew is, for instance, more closely related to the kangaroo than it is to the
American shrew. This has consequences for the scope and structure of inferences we
can make about the Kinds. The more we know about an individual’s spatial temporal
position in the tree of speciation (we may know the whole, a partial bit of the tree,
or more commonly just the close ancestors and the descendants), the more we know
about of which inferences are justified, including what conservation efforts might be
deemed appropriate (Eldridge et al. 2014). At the same time the use of diverse and
independent sources of evidence in lineage reconstruction reduces the probability of
systematic errors and biases.
So although uncovering lineages is dependent on tracking intrinsic traits of indi-
viduals as well as on auxiliary hypotheses tied to specific phylogenetic methods, this
should not make us skeptical of objective lineages. On the contrary, the use of tri-
angulation should strengthen our confidence in scientifically progressive knowledge
of the tree of branching species. With triangulation we can empirically and consis-
tently move toward improved individuation criteria of a species; triangulation takes
us beyond a series of classifications according to convention.
Authors skeptical of the epistemic credentials of historical essences would at this
point dig in their heels claiming that historical essences are not sufficient for the
purposes of individuating species taxon. For instance, Michael Devitt alleges that the
historical account would not be able to distinguish “a species from the species that
preceded and succeeded it in its lineage” (2008, p. 367).
First it might be useful to manage expectations a bit by conceding the limits of
essential natures of particular Kinds. For one, it is not clear that they should be able to
sort out all higher-order questions about what makes a particular Kind a species (rather
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than, say, a higher class or a subspecies)—what is sometimes known as the species
category problem. After all, analogous higher order or contrastive questions can be
posed for most, if not all, putative Kinds that figure in scientific taxonomies. That
is, in chemistry we can ask not only what makes a sample a member of magnesium,
but also, what makes it a chemical element; or, in the case of gender, we can ask,
not only what makes someone a women, but also, what makes someone belong to a
certain gender (as opposed to another social kind, e.g. sexuality)? In these cases it is
not quite clear that membership conditions of the first order will be informative of the
higher order contrastive questions. I am afraid my concern here is limited to providing
the criteria of identity of particular Kinds commonly understood to be species, such
as humans (Homo sapiens), Christmas Island shrew (Crocidura attenuata trichura)
and African bush elephant (Loxodonta africana). I have argued that an individual’s
membership in either of these Kinds is determined by its place in a spatial–temporal
order of individuals; i.e. by its historical relation or relational property. I do not take
myself to be offering an argument as to whether these Kinds are truly species rather
than biological Kinds of a different sort. Such higher-order or contrastive questions
probably deserve a separate treatment. In the case of species, answers are probably
going to hinge on debates about typical patterns of speciation (gradual or defined by
punctuated equilibrium) and typical causes of speciation events and new ancestral
populations (e.g. are mechanisms of reproductive isolation or hybridization barriers
required for speciation and the acquisition of relevant adaptations, or do we need to
add an asexual equivalent mechanism, like the competition for living spaces).10 What
I will say is that these and other debates are best made sense of on the assumption of an
underlying conceptual unity where a necessary property of a species taxon is still its
historical essence (De Queiroz 1999). That also means that reproductive isolation can
be understood as evidence of species differentiation rather than a necessary property
for species membership (De Queiroz 2007, p. 882).
Still Devitt might insist that his concern is a first-order matter and not only a higher
order one about the species category. The thought seems to be the following: We need
a sufficient criteria in addition to the necessary historical lineage to individuate the
Kind which members belong to; otherwise we will not have a way of determining
when an ancestral population is formed and when the lineage commences. In short we
will not be able to mark out a biological Kind from the one that immediately precedes
it—regardless of whether these Kinds are truly species or not. Devitt continues to press
this type of concern in favor of adopting a biological intrinsic essentialism (2008, 2010;
see also Elder 2008). LaPorte (2005) instead suggests that this concern should leads us
to some form of historical conventionalism, since non-epistemic political criteria might
be introduced to decide things like whether Neanderthals (Homo neanderthalensis)
10 For the reasons mentioned in footnote 7 where some groups of organisms, like bacteria (commonly
thought to be species) may not form reproductive lineages, I am also open toward a pluralism about
the species category. Notice that endorsing such a position, however, does not lead to pluralism about
particular species or indeed scepticism toward individual species having definite lineages. As Joseph LaPorte
writes:”Suppose that the species category is disjunctive, because some species are reproductively united and
others are ecologically united. This would not indicate that any one species—a species of oaks, say—has a
disjunctive essence. It would not. That species’ essence would be ecological, not ecological OR reproductive.
Individual lineages like the different oaks or like H. sapiens would remain integrated and natural biologically,
united by one measure or the other for species” (2017, p. 190).
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is really a distinct species from Homo sapiens. For LaPorte then, there really is no
such thing as an “objective evolutionary tree of life” (however see LaPorte 2017 for a
suggestion that he now favors a historical essentialism of species).
Notice first that a conventionalism does not simply follow from the existence of
disagreement about politically controversial cases of branching. It is still open for
scientific realists to argue that with respect to individuation conditions of a majority
of different species like, Homo sapiens, Christmas Island shrew (Crocidura attenuata
trichura) and African bush elephant (Loxodonta Africana) scientific progress has been
made. A shared historical relation or historical essence has been established or is in
the process of being established via triangulation: data has been gathered to trace
a relevant historical essences through phylogenetics and cladistics and finally some
branching events have been hypothesized which have a higher degree of support.
Still, many have with Devitt supposed that even with the appeal to objective branch-
ing events with higher degrees of support, historical essentialism does at least need to
be supplemented with some form of origin essentialism (see e.g. Hull 1978; Griffiths
1999; Okasha 2002). In addition to having a unique spatial temporal relation, each
Kind of species would then also have a particular origin that is essential to the Kind.
But I think there is a compelling argument that there needs not be such an appendage.
Marc Ereshefsky has recently suggested that a historical essentialist can also embrace
speciation as a path dependent process where the origin is an unnecessary addition
(2014). The notion of path dependency will be elaborated upon in the next section,
but for now the idea is simply that speciation is not merely a matter of mutations for
new adaptations (and perhaps, reproductive isolation) occurring, but also a matter of
a specific order and pathway of events, such as the temporal order of mutations. If the
order of mutations were reorganized, speciation may in fact not have occurred (Beatty
2006).
So according to Ereshefsky, it is rather the other way around: the whole idea of an
origin or a starting point for a species demands that an historical pathway has already
been underway:
If one looks at the branching event at the time it occurs, a species’ identity is
not determined (ontologically) because the existence of that species is not yet
established. Further along the historical path of the branch, we can retrospectively
say that the new species began at the branching event […] If we want to talk
about a species’ essence in a historical sense, then that essence must be a species’
origin plus its unique path. But in that case, the notion of origin is redundant:
the idea of a unique path assumes a starting point. (2014, pp. 724–725)
I think this argument from Ereshefsky is compelling; the necessary and sufficient
criteria for individuating species Kinds is already part and parcel of their historical
essence. If a particular path dependent process constitutes a speciation, then that is
the essence and origin essentialism is simply unnecessary to individuate the Kind.
One might also think that we should not even aim to ascertain any starting-points
or branching events because such events are extended in time and are complex and
often vague.11 No matter for the historical essentialist: as long as an individual gains
11 I thank an anonymous reviewer from this journal for making this possibility salient to me. In fact, when
pressed most authors accept some degree of vagueness with respect to the starting-point and branching
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its Kind membership via its involvement in the particular historical lineage, scientific
progress in tracking this unique path is possible, regardless of how we conceive of the
path’s beginning.
3.2 Causal explanation
Perhaps the chief concern about importing a historical essentialism into a defense
of scientific realism concerns their ability to satisfy the causal explanatory role of
essences. A common view is that in order to perform the role of causally explaining
the common traits of a species or a Kind, one must refer to intrinsic features of
individual members. Samir Okasha argues for this assumption as follows:
If members of a kind K share only a relational property that means they may
differ widely with respect to intrinsic properties. But since an object’s causal
propensities are usually thought to supervene on its intrinsic properties alone,
K will include only those objects whose causal propensities are very different,
which means that predictively useful generalizations are unlikely to exist. (2002,
p. 208)
Of course, a central assumption of this paper is that despite intra-species variation, a
species does support at least some important causal generalizations across their mem-
bers (in terms of physiology, morphology, habitats, mating patterns etc.). This is all
part of the explanandum to which our causal explanans should be tailored. Hence,
the aim of the next section is to show that although many—but not all—of the causal
propensities of the individual/object do in fact supervene on members’ intrinsic fea-
tures, it is nevertheless the historical essences of species that offer causal explanations
of the Kind’s inductive unity or multiple projectability. In passing I will also chal-
lenge Okasha’s assumption that causal propensities supervene on intrinsic properties
alone. At least many behavioral phenotypes also supervene on extrinsic—environ-
mental—properties of the organism.
Some initial plausibility of this explanatory claim has already been rehearsed. In
Sect. 2, I suggested that the intuitive support for a historical essence providing the
identity of a Kind might actually derive from its explanatory power. That is, I proposed
that there are good reasons to think that there is an intimate connection between the
individuation condition and explanatory condition such that it is the explanatory power
of a property or relation that gives us reason to think that it individuates the Kind in
the first place. If so, any success of historical essences as grounds for individuating
a species might already ride on their ability to explain what I have referred to as the
species’ multiple projectability—a quality that is essentially distributed over a Kind’s
members. In the last section, I argued that historical essences satisfy the individuation
condition by being the property that is uniquely shared amongst all members; it is
the necessary property, which an individual cannot lose without also ceasing to be a
member of a species taxon. The argument that historical essences were also sufficient
Footnote 11 continued
event of different lineages. Michael Devitt for example writes: “[E]veryone agrees that there comes a point
where two organisms that have some common ancestor are nonetheless of different species. Yet there is no
determinate matter of fact about precisely where that point is”. (2008, p. 373, emphasis in original).
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rested on the appeal of path dependent, temporally ordered, explanations of branching
events. If we accept this argument it would seem like the individuation conditions do
in part rest on the ability historical essences and path dependency have to explain.
The task now is to argue for the explanatory role of historical essences more directly.
An initial pessimism toward historical essences—especially amongst scientific real-
ists—stems not from an apparent lack of explanatory power per se, but from the view
that historical explanations constitute nominal or conventional explanations, rather
than causal explanations. As is well known, David Hull was one of the early and
prominent proponents of species as historical entities (1978).12 What is probably less
well known in these debates is his general defense of the explanatory credentials of
historical narratives. For Hull historical narratives are a species of explanation—in-
tegrationist explanations—that go via integrating an event into an organized whole
(1975).
Of course here we are not concerned with explaining events as much as the emer-
gence of a Kind with a distinctive inductive unity. Still, much of the same virtues
of historical explanations in biology have been emphasized in Desjardins (2011) and
Ereshefsky’s (2012, 2014) recent work on path dependent explanations where it is
precisely the properties of different biological Kinds such as species and homologues
that are explained by citing their historical structure. All authors stress that integra-
tionist or path dependent explanations do not conform to a Hempel-style covering law
model of explanation or a Salmon-style causal model of explanation, which require
that an initial condition and an inference-maker (a law or causal generalization) are
cited. For integrationist or structural explanations, it would also be insufficient to cite
the initial causal state or origin of a species (e.g. last common ancestor or source of
novel adaptations etc.). Historical explanations are path dependent in a strong sense
by including all relevant causal factors and their order relevant to the explanandum
(Ereshefsky 2012, 2014). Perhaps because of the contrast with the covering law and
causal models, Hull also wavers about the causal nature of these part-whole expla-
nations suggesting that the historical relation between the parts of a lineage is one
of constitutive dependence between the parts, their sequence of organization, and the
whole. Of course some integrationist explanations are probably not causal, but consti-
tutive explanations, like that of a decomposition of a mechanism into its constitutive
parts. But it does not follow that at least some integrationist historical explanations
cannot qualify as causal explanations.
The notion of path dependency allows us to adopt two perspectives on the historical
essences of species. The one argued for in Sect. 3.1 is that of individuation: an exclusive
and distinctive spatial–temporal pattern belonging to a particular species taxon (that
is, of the different evolutionary pathway each species taxon has, in fact, taken). But as
discussed, in order to access this historical pattern one also has to incorporate causal
evidence (e.g. evidence of homologous rather than analogous traits and evidence of
reproductive isolation). From the perspective of path dependent explanations it then
seems just as legitimate to regard phylogenetics as a means of tracing a token causal
process. Indeed these perspectives can be seen as two sides of the same coin. The
12 Of course Hull argued that species are individuals rather than, sets, classes or, indeed, Kinds. For present
purposes I accept that there is no tension between thinking a species taxon can be both an individual and a
Kind with a historical essence (for arguments see, Griffiths 1999; Millikan 2000; Rieppel 2007).
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pattern of spatially-temporally ordered members of a species taxon do not come about
through some pre-established harmony; the pattern comes about through a range of
causally connected events.
Having established that historical path dependency qualifies as a bona fide causal
explanation, we are at a point to see why historical essences causally explain multiple
projectability specifically. They explain in virtue of the nature and order of causally
connected events. Compare the lineage or pathway of a species with that of a timeline.
The latter can be thought of a useful representation of a purely temporal sequence of
events. But it can also be misleading: temporally ordered events of a timeline need
not have any particular causal relation with one another or with an overall outcome.
In contrast, the spatial–temporal pattern of a lineage is useful not merely as it orders
events temporally (and spatially); if it is correct, or approximately so, it also reveals a
particular causal pathway of organisms coming about and at the same time retaining
projectable features with their ancestors. Past members both produce new members
and reproduce features of the species. That is, by bringing new organisms about, past
members also ensure that they share properties with their ancestors. This reproductive
connection between different members is why a historical essence explains a Kind’s
multiple projectability—why it is that members of a Kind jointly achieve a certain
reliable inductive structure.
On closer examination then, historical essentialism of a Kind such as a particular
species demands some reproductive or near reproductive relation.13 Only then can
we causally explain why members share multiple features with one another because
of their history. If one were to overlook the significance of reproduction, one might
agree with Muhammed Khalidi’s view that historical Kinds also occur in chemistry.
Khalidi gives the example of most helium-4 in the universe being created by the past
combination of two helium-3, a nuclei reaction that emits 2 protons (2013, p. 139).
But Kinds like different species have historical essences in a much stronger sense. It
is not merely that there can be or often is a causal contact with previous members,
but that there must be—a new token member must be born of previous members (or
in boundary cases, closely related ancestors). Otherwise the historical pathway would
also cease to be explanatory of the Kind’s multiple projectable properties.
The causal path dependency also bestows the explanation of multiple projectability
with counterfactual force. If there had been different causal factors and a different
temporal or spatial order of events along the way, the species’ lineage would also have
been different and different projectable properties would have been associated with
it. In fact, historical explanations might seem maximally sensitive to counterfactual
change. That is, had any part of history been different, the species would also have
been a different one from the one it actually is. However, though the historical pathway
certainly confers a significant counterfactual force to the explanation, we must also
keep the explanandum in mind; namely, the species’ distinctive multiple projectability.
Not all events in its pathway will therefore affect the Kind’s distinctive inductive
structure and need to figure in the explanans. Some relatively minor events in the
course of the lineage will be included in the explanans, such as an organism’s retention
13 There might be some ecological mechanism that is sufficient for forming lineages of species, but I will
not explore this here—see e.g. LaPorte (2017).
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of a novel mutation in response to a changing niche; other events, such as, presumably,
some still births, may have no bearing on the overall multiple projectability and so can
safely be excluded from the explanans. It follows that they will not affect the identity
of the species either. Equally, the relevant multiple projectability can subsume traits
that were also present prior to the evolution of a particular species, but the casual
historical explanation will then not include the emergence of such traits, but only their
retention within the lineage.
Once we regard historical essences as token causal processes in their own right, we
can also ask for a causal productive explanation of those processes. Now we have a
different explanandum in mind: what forms of causal interaction forge the reproductive
bonds of Kinds with historical essential natures?14 In the case of species, the explanans
would presumably draw on proximate mechanisms for the production of new members
and the retention (and systematic variation) of traits amongst particular species taxon
members. Recent work in epigenetics and niche constriction theory, suggest we should
then also go beyond the intrinsic properties of organisms in our explanans. That is,
causal mechanisms that are extrinsic yet proximate to the organism can also contribute
to the stability of many traits, either by being a condition for successful reproduction
of traits, reproducing traits on their own, or by weeding out deleterious mutations.
Note however that this does not make the conjunction of proximate reproductive
mechanisms rival explanations to historical essences. To be clear, the historical essence
qua token causal process still causally explains the presence of multiple projectable
properties associated with different species. However there is a closely related explana-
tory project about what proximate causal features produce the reproductive links of
Kinds like species. These proximate mechanisms are nonetheless non-essential to
the Kind, especially as they may vary amongst individuals and over the course of a
species’ lineage. Hence, pace Devitt, they are not able to offer rival intrinsic accounts
of the essence of a species (see also Godman and Papineau (2019) for an explicit argu-
ment for why a historical-reproductive explanation is not only independent of, but also
superior to, Devitt’s intrinsic essentialism). Nor has the explanatory buck been passed
to more proximate features of the organisms; the explanandum in this case has simply
changed.15
We now have an improved response to Okasha’s concern mentioned in the beginning
of this section. It is of course true that if members were to differ greatly with respect
to intrinsic properties it would be strange to think they would nevertheless share many
morphological and behavioral properties. But if we take historical essences of species
to be an explanandum, we can see why the intrinsic properties may vary but will, in
fact, not vary greatly amongst members. This is because they are realized by many of
14 For an instructive discussion of how to formulate an account of reproduction that does not bias us toward
gene flow as the paradigm of reproduction (see Godfrey-Smith 2009, Ch. 4).
15 Notice that the explanations here—i.e. one that asks to explain the presence of multiple projectability
and the other that asks about the production of reproductive links (or in indeed, the production of individual
traits of species)—is not the same as the distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations (Mayr
1961). I am not persuaded that the notion of essence has much work to do in connection with the Mayr’s
question about evolutionary history. I have argued that talk of essences earns its keep when we need to
explain a body of generalizations of Kinds such as different species, rather than single traits of a Kind (see
also Godman and Papineau (2019)). I thank and anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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the same proximate causal feature or mechanisms in individual members’ development
and life span. It is just that we are liberated from the straightjacket of claiming that
these features are essential to the species. In sum, it should no longer be a mystery
how species are able to support causal generalizations despite having “only” historical
essences.
4 Conclusion
I have argued that species have historical essences in ways that should matter for those
interested in the nature of species and for those wishing to defend scientific realism
in the non-fundamental sciences. For those interested in the debate about the nature
of species, my aim has been to provide stronger support for the idea that species have
historical essential natures by demonstrating their hitherto underestimated credentials
in terms of individuation and explanation. For scientific realists, I have wanted to
give a better sense of why a posteriori essential natures, and historical essences in
particular, are suitable companions to scientific realists in biology and other “historical
sciences” (Millikan 1999). I have made this case by showing how in the paradigm case
of species, historical essential natures do yield robust individuation and membership
criteria as well as causal explanations of multiply projectable features. Moreover, we
have seen that the notion of path dependency inherent in historical essences adjoins
individuation with explanation. While the scope for applying similar defenses for other
putative historical Kinds remains for another day, at least the principled resistance to
such a defense has hopefully been cleared.
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